Evolution of cooperation facilitated by reinforcement learning with
  adaptive aspiration levels by Tanabe, Shoma & Masuda, Naoki
ar
X
iv
:1
10
6.
61
07
v2
  [
q-
bio
.PE
]  
5 N
ov
 20
11 Evolution of cooperation facilitated by reinforcement
learning with adaptive aspiration levels
Shoma Tanabe1 and Naoki Masuda2,3,∗
1 Faculty of Engineering, University of Tokyo
7-3-1 Hongo, Bunkyo, Tokyo 113-8656, Japan
2 Graduate School of Information Science and Technology
University of Tokyo, 7-3-1 Hongo, Bunkyo, Tokyo 113-8656, Japan
3 PRESTO, Japan Science and Technology Agency
4-1-8 Honcho, Kawaguchi, Saitama 332-0012, Japan
∗ Corresponding author (masuda@mist.i.u-tokyo.ac.jp)
September 28, 2018
Abstract
Repeated interaction between individuals is the main mechanism for maintaining cooperation
in social dilemma situations. Variants of tit-for-tat (repeating the previous action of the op-
ponent) and the win-stay lose-shift strategy are known as strong competitors in iterated social
dilemma games. On the other hand, real repeated interaction generally allows plasticity (i.e.,
learning) of individuals based on the experience of the past. Although plasticity is relevant to
various biological phenomena, its role in repeated social dilemma games is relatively unexplored.
In particular, if experience-based learning plays a key role in promotion and maintenance of
cooperation, learners should evolve in the contest with nonlearners under selection pressure.
By modeling players using a simple reinforcement learning model, we numerically show that
learning enables the evolution of cooperation. We also show that numerically estimated adap-
tive dynamics appositely predict the outcome of evolutionary simulations. The analysis of the
adaptive dynamics enables us to capture the obtained results as an affirmative example of the
Baldwin effect, where learning accelerates the evolution to optimality.
1 Introduction
The mechanisms of cooperation in social dilemma situations are a central topic in interdis-
ciplinary research fields including evolutionary biology, ecology, economics, and sociology. As
analyzed by the prisoner’s dilemma (PD) game and its relatives, direct reciprocity is among the
main known mechanisms underlying cooperative behavior (Trivers, 1971; Axelrod, 1984). In di-
rect reciprocity, iterated interaction between the same individuals motivates them to continue
cooperating (C) rather than to defecting (D) to obtain momentarily large payoffs; defection
would be negatively rewarded by the opponent player’s retaliation in later rounds. Variants of
the celebrated retaliatory strategy tit-for-tat (mimicking the opponent’s action in the previous
round) (Nowak & Sigmund, 1992) and a win-stay lose-shift strategy (Kraines & Kraines, 1989;
Nowak & Sigmund, 1993) are recognized as strong competitors in the iterated PD game.
In the iterated games concerning direct reciprocity, it is natural to assume that players mod-
ify their strategies in response to their experiences in past rounds. The tit-for-tat, its variants,
and win-stay lose-shift strategies can be interpreted as examples of such learning strategies
because the tit-for-tat, for example, implies that the player selects the action (i.e., C or D)
depending on the result of the last round. A more sophisticated learning player of this kind
exploits a longer history of the game for action selection (e.g., cooperate if the player and the op-
ponent cooperated in the previous two rounds, and defect otherwise) (Lindgren, 1991). Classes
of other learning models include fictitious play and reinforcement learning (Camerer, 2003;
Fudenberg & Levine, 1998). Learning apparently seems beneficial in iterated games because
learning players are more flexible than nonlearning players.
If learning is a key factor in promoting cooperation in real societies, the number of learn-
ing players should increase when a population evolves under selection pressure. However,
the advantage of learners over nonlearners in evolutionary dynamics is elusive because a pair
of learning players often results in mutual defection (Macy, 1996; Sandholm & Crites, 1996;
Posch et al., 1999; Taiji & Ikegami, 1999; Macy & Flache, 2002; Masuda & Ohtsuki, 2009) and
learning may be costly.
The constructive roles of learning in the evolution of certain traits are collectively called the
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Baldwin effect (see Simpson, 1953; Turney et al., 1996; Weber & D. J. Depew, 2003; Crispo,
2007; Badyaev, 2009 for reviews). Although earlier examples of the Baldwin effect are not neces-
sarily founded on firm empirical evidence (Simpson, 1953; Weber & Depew, 2003), there exists
a plethora of positive evidence of the Baldwin effect. Examples include fly’s morphological de-
velopments (Waddington, 1942), colonization of house finch in North America (Badyaev, 2009),
and persistence of coastal juncos (Yeh & Price, 2004). In fact, the concept of the Baldwin
effect differs by authors (see Simpson, 1953; Downes, 2003; Turney et al., 1996). Although ear-
lier computational models suggest that learning accelerates evolution (Hinton & Nowlan, 1987;
Ancel, 1999; Maynard Smith, 1987), later theoretical and numerical studies suggest that learn-
ing either accelerates or decelerates evolution toward the optimum depending on the details
of the models (Ancel, 2000; Dopazo et al., 2001; Borenstein et al., 2006; Paenke et al., 2007;
Paenke et al., 2009). The advantage of learning in evolution is also nontrivial in this broader
context.
We numerically investigate the effect of learning on evolution in the iterated PD game. This
question was explored in previous literature (Suzuki & Arita, 2004; also see Wang et al., 2008 for
discussion). Our emphasis in this study is to use a reinforcement learning model for the iterated
PD game (Masuda & Nakamura, 2011) that is much simpler in terms of the number of plastic
elements than the plastic look-up-table model adopted in (Suzuki & Arita, 2004). In our model,
players are satisfied with and persist in the current action when the obtained payoff is larger than
a plastic threshold. Our model of players introduced in (Masuda & Nakamura, 2011) modifies
those in (Karandikar et al., 1998; Posch et al., 1999; Macy & Flache, 2002). Via the stability
analysis for nonlearning players, the numerical analysis of the discretized adaptive dynamics
with nonlearning and learning players, and full evolutionary simulations, we show that learning
is needed for a noncooperative population to evolve to be able to engage in mutual cooperation
for wide parameter ranges. We also discuss our results in the context of the Baldwin effect.
2
2 Model
2.1 Iterated PD game
We assume that each player plays the PD game against each of the other players in a population.
In each round t (t = 1, 2, . . .) within a generation, a player selects C or D without knowing
the action (i.e., C or D) of the opponent player. The payoff to the focal player is defined by
(C D
C R S
D T P
)
, (1)
where T > R > P > S and R > (T + S)/2. Equation (1) represents the row player’s payoff.
The payoff to the opponent (column player) is defined likewise; the PD game is symmetric.
Because T > R and P > S, mutual defection is the only Nash equilibrium of the single-shot
PD game.
However, players may continue mutual cooperation for their own benefits in the iterated
PD game (Trivers, 1971; Axelrod, 1984). We denote the number of rounds per generation by
tmax. Technically, the Nash equilibrium of the iterated PD game is perpetual mutual defection
if the players know tmax beforehand. The number of rounds is often randomized to avoid this
effect (Axelrod, 1984). To simplify the analysis, we assume that the players are unaware of the
fixed value of tmax.
Earlier studies identified tit-for-tat, which involves imitating the previous action of the oppo-
nent, as a strong strategy in the iterated PD game when various strategies coexist in a popula-
tion (Trivers, 1971; Axelrod, 1984). However, later studies showed that tit-for-tat is not robust
against error and that alternative strategies such as generous tit-for-tat (Nowak & Sigmund, 1992)
and Pavlov (Kraines & Kraines, 1989; Nowak & Sigmund, 1993) are strong competitors in the
iterated PD game with error. By definition, a Pavlov player receiving payoff T or R is satisfied
and does not change the action in the next round, whereas the same player receiving payoff P
or S is dissatisfied and flip the action. A population composed of Pavlov players, for example,
realizes mutual cooperation such that a player gains approximately R per round.
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2.2 Reinforcement learning
Intuitively, the ability to learn may seem to be an advantageous trait in the iterated PD game
if the cost of learning is negligible. However, this is generally not the case. A pair of learn-
ing players often ends up with mutual defection unless a learning algorithm is carefully designed
(Macy, 1996; Sandholm & Crites, 1996; Posch et al., 1999; Taiji & Ikegami, 1999; Macy & Flache, 2002;
Masuda & Ohtsuki, 2009). Learning requires trial and error, i.e., the exploration of unknown
behavioral patterns as well as the exploitation of known advantageous behavioral patterns. Ex-
ploratory behavior of a learning player may look just random to opponents, and it is rational
to defect against random-looking players.
To compromise the possibility of mutual cooperation, the simplicity of the learning algo-
rithm, and the biological plausibility of the model as compared to some other learning algo-
rithms, we use a variant of the Bush–Mosteller (BM) reinforcement learning model (Masuda & Nakamura, 2011).
This model modifies the models in the previous literature (Karandikar et al., 1998; Posch et al., 1999;
Macy & Flache, 2002) such that players learn to mutually cooperate for wide parameter ranges.
In round t, the cooperability of the learning player is given by the probability pt. We update
pt using the results of the single-shot PD game as follows:
pt+1 =


pt + (1− pt)st (action in round t is C, and st ≥ 0),
pt + ptst (action in round t is C, and st < 0),
pt − ptst (action in round t is D, and st ≥ 0),
pt − (1− pt)st (action in round t is D, and st < 0),
(2)
where
st = tanh[β(rt − At)], (3)
and rt ∈ {R, T, S, P} is the payoff to the player in round t. st stands for the degree of satisfaction
in round t. When st is large, the player increases the probability of taking the current action
in round t + 1. For example, the third line in Eq. (2) indicates that the player decreases the
probability of cooperation pt because selecting D in round t has yielded a satisfactory outcome.
In addition, we assume that the player misimplements the action with a small probability ǫ
such that the player in fact cooperates with probability (1−2ǫ)pt+ ǫ in round t. Equations (2)
and (3) indicate that the player is satisfied with the current situation if the obtained payoff rt
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is larger than the so-called aspiration level At. Otherwise, the player is motivated to flip the
action. β controls the sensitivity in the plasticity of pt. If β = 0, st = 0 for any t such that pt
is constant. If β =∞, st = 1 or −1 for any t such that pt+1 = 1 or 0.
Unless otherwise stated, we set the initial condition to p1 = 0, i.e., the player defects in
round 1. This value of p1 is the most adverse to mutual cooperation. We will confirm in
Secs. 3.1 and 3.4 that our main results are qualitatively the same if we set p1 = 1.
The dynamics of the aspiration level are given by
At+1 = (1− h)At + hrt, (4)
where h represents the learning rate. If h = 0, At is constant, and the model is equivalent
to the classical BM model. If h = 1, the player compares the current payoff and the payoff
obtained in the last round to determine st. In our previous work, we showed that mutual
cooperation is established among the players only after tmax = 100 rounds if β is large and h is
small (Masuda & Nakamura, 2011). In the numerical simulations, we set β = 3, which is large
enough to support mutual cooperation if other conditions, such as small h and small ǫ, are met.
We remark that the initial condition A1 is a key parameter to characterize the player.
2.3 Evolutionary dynamics
We set the number of players in the population to N = 500. In a single generation, each
player i plays the iterated PD game with tmax = 200 against all the other players. We always
reset pt and At to p1 and A1 when a player starts the iterated PD game with a new opponent.
The single generation payoff ri (∈ [S, T ]) is equal to the summation of the payoff obtained by
playing against N − 1 players, which is divided by (N − 1)tmax.
After the single generation payoffs to all the players are determined, we select two players i
and j with equal probability for strategy update. We use the Fermi rule (Szabo & Toke, 1998;
Traulsen et al., 2006) in which player i adopts j’s A1 and h values in the next generation with
probability 1/
[
1 + exp
(
β˜(ri − rj)
)]
, and player j adopts i’s parameter values, otherwise. We
set β˜ = 1. To account for mutation, we assume that after strategy update, A1 and h of the
adopter are displaced by random small values obeying the uniform density on [−∆A1 ,∆A1 ]
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and [−∆h,∆h], respectively. If the displaced h exceeds 1 or is negative, we reset h to 1 or 0,
respectively. However, the resetting seldom occurs in our evolutionary simulations.
The phenotype of a player in round t is specified by pt and At. It should be noted that pt
and At are not inherited over generations. In other words, the natural selection operates on the
capacity to learn (i.e., h) but not on the acquired behavior (i.e., pt and At). Because we let β in
Eq. (3) to be relatively large to realize mutual cooperation (Masuda & Nakamura, 2011), pt is
sensitive to the excess payoff relative to At in the sense that pt is close to 0 or 1 unless rt is close
to At. Therefore, pt is similar to the probability of cooperation conditioned on the outcome
of the PD game in the previous round. When we use the term learning in the following, we
exclusively refer to that induced by h in the iterated PD game. A positive value of h directly
raises the plasticity of At and indirectly controls that of pt.
3 Results
3.1 Nash equilibria when without learning
To show that learning is necessary for the emergence of cooperation, we start by analyzing
the competition between players that do not learn. With learning rate h equal to zero, the
aspiration level is fixed over rounds (i.e., At = A1, t ≥ 1). For the sake of analysis, we set
β = ∞. Then, Eqs. (2) and (3) imply that the player persists in the current action (i.e.,
(pt, pt+1) = (0, 0) or (1, 1)) if rt − At ≥ 0 and flips the action (i.e., (pt, pt+1) = (0, 1) or (1, 0))
otherwise. When At is fixed, there are five strategies:
• Strategy st1 is defined by At < S. Except for the action misimplemantation, an st1 player
always cooperates or always defects, depending on the action in the first round.
• Strategy st2 is defined by S < At < P . An st2 player does not flip the action unless
rt = S.
• Strategy st3 is defined by P < At < R. An st3 player does not flip the action if mutual
cooperation or unilateral defection is realized. It is equivalent to Pavlov, which is a strong
competitor in the iterated PD game (Kraines & Kraines, 1989; Nowak & Sigmund, 1993).
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• Strategy st4 is defined by R < At < T . An st4 player flips the action unless rt = T .
• Strategy st5 is defined by T < At. An st5 player flips the action in every round except
when the player misimplements the action.
In Table 1, the average payoff to a nonlearning (i.e., h = 0) player (row player) playing
against another nonlearning player (column player) is shown for 0 < ǫ ≪ 1 and tmax = ∞.
For example, st1 playing against st2 obtains (R + 3P + 2S)/6 per round on an average. The
results shown in Table 1 are a subset of those obtained in (Nowak et al., 1995) (see Appendix
A for details). Table 1 indicates that st3 is a Nash equilibrium when the five strategies are
considered. In particular, st3 playing against another st3 realizes mutual cooperation and
obtains the largest average payoff per round R. Therefore, a unanimous population composed
of st3 players represents a eusocial situation. Mutual cooperation is not realized by any other
combination of two players.
Table 1 indicates that st2 is also a Nash equilibrium when 3P > R + 2S. In addition,
although st4 is not a Nash equilibrium, a homogeneous population composed of st4 players is
resistant to invasion by st3 in evolutionary situations because st4 gains a larger payoff than st3
does when playing against an st4 opponent.
To test the robustness of the results shown in Table 1, we set β = 3, ǫ = 0.02, and h = 0,
and numerically calculate the payoff averaged over tmax generations to different nonlearning
players with different fixed aspiration levels A1. We also set R = 4, T = 5, S = 0, and
P = 2 in this and the following numerical simulations. The average payoff to a nonlearner
playing against another nonlearner is shown for p1 = 0 and tmax = 200 in Fig. 1. The presented
values are averages over 100 trials for each pair of A1 values. The results shown in Fig. 1 are
qualitatively the same as those shown in Table 1. We also confirmed that the results hardly
change for (p1, tmax) = (0, 2000), (1, 200), and (1, 2000).
3.2 Possibility of mutual cooperation via learning
If h > 0, players different from st3 may adjust At until P < At < R is satisfied such that they
learn to behave as Pavlov. Therefore, learning may play a constructive role in the evolution
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of mutual cooperation. In fact, this is not always the case; ǫ > 0 is a necessary condition for
mutual cooperation to evolve.
To explain this point, we set β = 3 and h = 0.1, and numerically examine the behavior
of a pair of players. Typical time courses of the aspiration level for a pair of learning players
over rounds without action misimplementation (i.e., ǫ = 0) are shown in Fig. 2(a). Each of the
three pairs with close A1 values represents a pair of st1 (thick lines), st3 (dotted lines), and st5
players (medium lines), respectively. We used different values of A1 for each pair for the clarity
of the figure; making A1 equal for two players does not qualitatively change the results. The
thick lines in Fig. 2(a) indicate that the two st1 players playing with each other are satisfied
with payoff P = 2 obtained by mutual defection. Therefore, their aspiration levels converge to
At = P . The results would be the same if we start from a pair of st2 players or a combination
of an st1 player and an st2 player. A pair of st3 players begin mutual cooperation from the
second round, and their At values converge to R = 4 (dotted lines). Mutual cooperation is
also realized if the two players are initially either st4 or st5, although some rounds are required
before the players mutually cooperate (medium lines).
Although two learning players having At < P do not end up with mutual cooperation
when ǫ = 0, the action misimplementation (i.e., ǫ > 0) can trigger a shift from mutual de-
fection to mutual cooperation. Artificially generated time courses in the presence of action
implementation are shown in Fig. 2(b) for expository purposes. Until the intended action is
misimplemented (1 ≤ t ≤ 29 in Fig. 2(b)), two players starting with A1 < P keep mutual
defection (thick lines). When At has sufficiently approached P , we assume that one player mis-
implements the action (t = 30). Then, the At values of both players cross P from below within
a couple of rounds such that the players start to behave as Pavlov and mutually cooperate.
The possibility of mutual cooperation through this mechanism is sensitive to the value of h.
Two players starting with A1 < P end up with At > P owing to the action misimplementation
when (P − S)/(T − P ) < (1− h)2 (see Appendix B for derivation). When T = 5, S = 0, and
P = 2, this condition yields 0 < h < 1 −
√
2/3 ≈ 0.184 for an arbitrary value of R. Then, the
At values of the two players converge to R.
The At values also converge to R when we start with a pair of st3 players (dotted lines in
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Fig. 2(b)) and a pair of st4 or st5 players (medium lines in Fig. 2(b)). This is because mutual
cooperation is stable against action misimplementation; if one player turns into D by action
misimplementation in round t, both players defect in round t+1 and cooperate in round t+2,
if the actions are not misimplemented in rounds t + 1 and t + 2. This event sequence is likely
unless ǫ is large.
3.3 Adaptive dynamics
In the evolutionary numerical simulations that we will describe in Sec. 3.4, we allow the initial
aspiration level A1 and learning rate h to mutate (Sec. 2.3). If the distribution of A1 and that
of h for an evolving population are single peaked and sufficiently localized, we can grasp the
evolutionary dynamics for a population by tracking the dynamics of the population averages
of A1 and h, denoted by A1 and h, respectively. In the extreme case in which all the players
share identical values of A1 and h, the instantaneous dynamics of A1 and h are captured by
adaptive dynamics (Metz et al., 1996; Hofbauer & Sigmund, 1998; Hofbauer & Sigmund, 2003;
Doebeli et al., 2004). Adaptive dynamics reveal the possibility for mutants with a slightly
deviated parameter value to invade a homogeneous resident population. In this section, we
numerically examine two-dimensional adaptive dynamics with respect to A1 and h to foresee
the evolutionary simulations carried out in Sec. 3.4.
In this and the following sections, we set β = 3, p1 = 0, ǫ = 0.02, and tmax = 200 unless
otherwise stated. Consider a homogeneous population of players sharing the parameter values
A1 = A1 and h = h. A mutant player with aspiration level A
′
1 and learning rate h
′ can invade
the population if
π[s′, s]− π[s, s] > 0 (5)
or
π[s′, s]− π[s, s] = 0 and π[s′, s′]− π[s, s′] > 0, (6)
where s = (A1, h) and s
′ = (A′1, h
′) are the strategies of the resident and mutant players,
respectively, and π[s1, s2] represents the average payoff of strategy s1 when playing with strategy
s2. s is ESS if the converse of Eq. (5) or the converse of Eq. (6) is satisfied. If Eq. (5) or (6)
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is satisfied, the homogeneous population comprising strategy s would evolve toward s′. We
numerically calculate π[s′, s] − π[s, s], where s′ = (A1 + 0.2, h), (A1 − 0.2, h), (A1, h + 0.02),
and (A1, h − 0.02). We confine s
′ in the neighborhood of s because the amount of mutation
for A1 and h is assumed to be small. Examining π[s
′, s]− π[s, s] corresponds to looking at the
discretized adaptive dynamics, i.e., the discretized derivative of π[s′, s] with respect to s′ at
s′ = s.
For various values of A1 and h, π[s
′, s] − π[s, s] is shown in Fig. 3. The plotted values
are averages over 104 runs for any s. In Fig. 3(a), s′ = (A1 + 0.2, h) obtains a larger payoff
than s = (A1, h) in the red region. In this region, s
′ would invade a homogeneous resident
population of s such that A1 increases. In contrast, s
′ obtains a smaller payoff than s does in
the blue region. Figure 3(a) indicates that, if learning is prohibited (i.e., h = 0), the population
starting from A1 = 0, for example, is expected to evolve such that A1 increases, but only up to
A1 ≈ P = 2. Therefore, a population does not evolve from st2 to st3 without learning.
Figure 3(b), which reveals the possibility of invasion by mutant s′ = (A1 − 0.2, h) in the
resident population of s, is a sign flipped version of Fig. 3(a) in most parameter regions.
Nevertheless, neither the mutants with A′1 = A1 + 0.2 nor the ones with A
′
1 = A1 − 0.2 invade
the resident population (i.e., parameter regions colored in blue in both Figs. 3(a) and 3(b)) for
(A1, h) ≈ (2, 0) and along a bent line passing through (A1, h) ≈ (4, 0) and (A1, h) ≈ (4.3, 0.2).
These regions constitute singular points of the adaptive dynamics and serve as repellers. In
other words, A1 does not pass through ≈ P = 2 for h = 0 and ≈ R = 4 for various values of h
in adaptive dynamics. The observations for h = 0 that the homogeneous population of st2 is
not invaded by st3 mutants, that of st3 is not invaded by st2 or st4 mutants, and that of st4 is
not invaded by st3 mutants, are consistent with the results obtained in Sec. 3.1.
The possibility of invasion by mutant s′ = (A1, h+ 0.02) in the homogeneous population of
s = (A1, h) is shown in Fig. 3(c). The figure suggests that h would increase for a population
of st1 players (i.e., A1 < S = 0). Learning is preferred to nonlearning when A1 < 0 for the
following reason. As shown in Sec. 3.2, when h > 0 and ǫ > 0, At increases until the players
behave as Pavlov to mutually cooperate within a relatively small number of rounds (Fig. 2(b)).
In contrast, the players do not establish mutual cooperation when h = 0 or ǫ = 0, as shown in
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Sec. 3.1 (Fig. 2(a)). Figure 3(c) indicates that h increases up to h ≈ 0.15. This value of h is
consistent with the upper bound of h for mutual cooperation to be possible, which was derived
in Sec. 3.2. Based on these results, h is expected to initially increase in evolutionary dynamics
starting with a population of nonlearning st1 players. We refer to the stage of evolutionary
dynamics in which h increases as stage 1. The existence of stage 1 is also supported by Fig. 3(d)
in which the mutant has s′ = (A1, h− 0.02).
After h has increased, Figs. 3(a) and 3(b) imply that A1 increases to cross P = 2. When
h > 0, a larger value of A1 (< P ) is beneficial because fewer rounds are required for such
players to turn to Pavlov (i.e., At > P ). Once A1 exceeds P for a majority of players, they
earn a large average payoff ≈ R through mutual cooperation. We refer to the transition for
learning players from a small A1 corresponding to st1 or st2 to a large A1 corresponding to st3
as stage 2. Figures 3(a) and 3(b) indicate that the difference between π[s′, s] and π[s, s] when
A1, A1 + 0.2 < P , h > 0 is small, presumably because s and s
′ are only slightly different in
terms of the number of transient rounds before the entrance to A1 > P . Therefore, we expect
that stage 2 occurs slowly in evolutionary dynamics.
Although it is a minor phenomenon as compared to stages 1 and 2, a smaller h is more
beneficial on the boundary between st2 and st3 (i.e., At ≈ P = 2), as shown in Figs. 3(c) and
3(d). For expository purposes, time courses of the iterated PD game between an st2 player and
an st3 player are shown in Fig. 3(e). As shown by the solid lines, the initial st3 player flips
to st2 before establishing mutual cooperation if h > 0. In fact, a nonlearning st3 player (i.e.,
h = 0) realizes mutual cooperation with a learning st2 player in earlier rounds (dotted lines)
than a learning st3 player does (solid lines). Therefore, in evolutionary dynamics, h in the
vicinity of At ≈ P is expected to decrease. We refer to this transition as stage 3. It should be
noted that stage 3 occurs in a narrow range of A1 (i.e., A1 < P and A1+0.2 > P in Fig. 3(a)).
Through stages 1, 2, and 3, evolution from a defective population of nonlearning st1 players
to a cooperative population of st3 players is logically possible. In contrast, the emergence of
mutual cooperation is hampered if learning is prohibited.
After stage 3, A1 would not evolve beyond R; A1 ≈ R is a line of repellers in adaptive
dynamics, as already explained in Figs. 3(a) and 3(b). When P < A1 < R (i.e., 2 < A1 < 4),
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the mutant’s payoff is indistinguishable from the resident’s payoff unless h is large (Figs. 3(a)–
(d)). Therefore, A1 and h would perform approximately unbiased diffusion. This implies that
h that has decreased via stage 3 may increase again.
When at least one of the two players is st4 or st5, a player with a larger A1 is more
advantageous than the opponent with a smaller A1. This is because the former exploits the
latter in early rounds. Nevertheless, these players do not obtain the average payoff as large as
that for a pair of st3 players, which would start to mutually cooperate from the second round.
Therefore, st3 is stable against invasion by st4 and vice versa.
We predict that the learning rate would not eventually decrease to the small value in evolu-
tionary simulations. In other words, the disadvantage of learning is too small to be evolution-
arily relevant unless the cost of learning is explicitly incorporated.
To assess the robustness of the results obtained from the adaptive dynamics, we reproduced
Figs. 3(a)–(d) with ǫ = 0.05 and ǫ = 0.1. The results for ǫ = 0.05 are qualitatively the same
as those for ǫ = 0.02 (results not shown). The results for ǫ = 0.1 are different in some aspects
from those for ǫ = 0.02 (Fig. 4). Most notably, when ǫ = 0.1, st3 is no longer stable against
invasion by st2 even without learning (i.e., h = 0). Therefore, mutual cooperation would
not be stable in evolutionary dynamics. In Figs. 5(a) and 5(b), π[s′, s] − π[s, s] is shown for
(s, s′) = ((1.9, 0), (2.1, 0)) and (s, s′) = ((2.1, 0), (1.9, 0)), respectively, for a variety of values
of tmax and ǫ. Figure 5(a) indicates that an st3 mutant does not invade the population of st2
residents for all the examined values of tmax and ǫ. Figure 5(b) indicates that a population of
st3 residents is resistant to invasion by st2 mutants when tmax is large and ǫ (> 0) is small.
Nevertheless, st3 is stable for various values of tmax and ǫ. Because stage 2 is hampered when
ǫ = 0, ǫ must take an intermediate value for the learning-mediated mutual cooperation to
emerge.
3.4 Evolutionary simulations
The results in Sec. 3.3 predict the presence of a learning mediated evolutionary route from
a noncooperative population composed of st1 players to a cooperative population composed
of st3 players. In this section, we carry out direct numerical simulations of the evolutionary
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dynamics using a population composed of N = 500 players. We initially set h = 0 and select
A1 for each player independently from the uniform density on [S − 1, S]. Therefore, all the
players are initially nonlearning st1. Refer to Sec. 2.3 for details of the numerical setup.
The evolution of h, the total amount of plasticity experienced in a generation, defined
by
∑tmax−1
t=1 |At+1 −At|, r, and the fraction of mutual cooperation for an example run with
∆A1 = 0.05 and ∆h = 0.01 are shown in Fig. 6(a). The average learning rate h and the total
amount of plasticity rapidly increase until the ≈ 3.9×104th round. The payoff and the fraction
of mutual cooperation also increase during this period because st1 players learn to behave as
Pavlov when h > 0. This period corresponds to stage 1 described in Sec. 3.3. Then, the
fraction of mutual cooperation and the total amount of plasticity gradually increase until the
≈ 3.5 × 105th round, corresponding to stage 2. In the ≈ 3.5 × 105th round, an st3 mutant
emerges in the population mostly composed of st2 players and gains a larger payoff than st2
residents do. Then, st3 players rapidly replace st2 players in the population such that r/R and
the fraction of mutual cooperation suddenly increase (Fig. 6(a)). This is because stable mutual
cooperation between st3 players emerges in an early round, whereas that between st2 players
emerges after≈ 2/ǫ rounds. The learning rate decreases almost at the same time, corresponding
to stage 3. The time courses of the fractions of st1, st2, st3, st4, and st5 players corresponding to
the run shown in Fig. 6(a) are shown in Fig. 6(b). For example, the fraction of the st1 player is
defined by the fraction of players having A1 < S and any value of h. Figure 6(b) indicates that
the population initially composed of st1 players evolves to that of st3 players. The trajectory
of A1 and h corresponding to the same run is shown in Fig. 6(c). Figure 6(c) is consistent with
the scenario of the evolution of cooperation described in Sec. 3.3. The population evolves from
no cooperation to mutual cooperation via the three stages involving learning. After stage 3, A1
and h diffuse without a recognizable bias, which is also consistent with the results obtained in
Sec. 3.3 (white regions in Figs. 3(a)–(d)). However, it should be noted that the total amount
of plasticity remains small after stage 3.
To examine the robustness of the results, we carry out five runs of numerical simulations
for each of the different parameter sets; we could not carry out more extensive numerical
simulations because of the computational cost. We measure two quantities in each run. The
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first quantity is the number of generations necessary for h to exceed 0.1 for the first time.
We call this number the end of stage 1. The second quantity is the number of generations
necessary for A1 to exceed P for the first time. We call this number the end of stage 2. The
ends of stages 1 and 2 with ǫ = 0.02, ∆A1 = 0.05, and ∆h = 0.01 are equal to 257± 28 (×10
2)
and 3763 ± 1514 (×102), respectively, where the mean ± standard deviation on the basis of
the five runs are indicated. Those with ǫ = 0.05, ∆A1 = 0.05, and ∆h = 0.01 are equal to
299 ± 55 (×102) and 6951 ± 4231 (×102). Those with ǫ = 0.01, ∆A1 = 0.05, and ∆h = 0.01
are equal to 265 ± 31 (×102) and 3780 ± 1547 (×102). Those with ǫ = 0.02, ∆A1 = 0.02, and
∆h = 0.01 are equal to 239± 18 (×10
2) and 9151± 6836 (×102). For this parameter set, one
out of the five runs did not reach the end of stage 2 within 2× 106 generations, such that the
statistics are based on the other four runs. Those with ǫ = 0.02, ∆A1 = 0.05, and ∆h = 0.005
are equal to 613± 119 (×102) and 3504± 999 (×102). Mutual cooperation evolves via learning
(i.e., finite value of the end of stage 2 up to our numerical efforts) in most cases. When ǫ = 0.05,
evolution to mutual cooperation is slower than when ǫ = 0.02. This may be because learning
players having different values of A1 turn into Pavlov (i.e., At > P ) within a small number of
rounds when ǫ is relatively large. Then, the payoff to different learning players would differ
relatively little to weaken the selection pressure.
We perform another robustness test. For the original parameter values ǫ = 0.02, ∆A1 = 0.05,
and ∆h = 0.01, the trajectory of A1 and h obtained from a single run with p1 = 1 is shown
in Fig. 7. The results are qualitatively the same as those for p1 = 0 (Fig. 6(c)) although
establishment of cooperation takes a considerably larger number of generations when p1 = 1
than when p1 = 0.
3.5 Baldwin effect
If we assume an explicit cost of learning, the learning rate decreases after mutual cooperation
is reached. An example time course of A1 and h when a linear cost −ch is added to the single
generation payoff to each player (Suzuki & Arita 2004; see Ancel 1999, 2000 for a different
implementation of the explicit learning cost), where c = 1, is shown in Fig. 8(a). The final
value of h is smaller than that in the case without the learning cost (Fig. 6(c)). The result
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shown in Fig. 6(d) is an example of the standard Baldwin effect in which the learning rate
initially increases and then decreases (Ancel, 2000; Dopazo et al., 2001; Borenstein et al., 2006;
Paenke et al., 2007; Paenke et al., 2009).
We examine the robustness of the observed Baldwin effect against the variation of c. An
example time course of A1 and h when c = 10 is shown in Fig. 8(b). As compared to when c = 1
(Fig. 8(a)), h is smaller throughout the evolution, and A1 increases more slowly. Nevertheless,
the population mostly consists of st3 players in the end. We carried out five runs for various
values of c. The largest h value in 106 generations is shown in Fig. 8(c) for each run. The
largest h value decreases with c because learning is costly for a large value of c. The final value
of h, calculated as the average over the last 104 generations, is shown in Fig. 8(d). The final
value of h is considerably smaller than the largest value (Fig. 8(c)) for each c, indicative of
stage 3 of the Baldwin effect. The final value of A1, calculated as the average over the last 10
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generations, is plotted against c in Fig. 8(e). If this value is larger than P = 2 and smaller
than R = 4, we expect that the final population is mostly composed of st3 players and that
the Baldwin effect is operative. Figure 8(e) suggests that the Baldwin effect occurs in the five
runs when c < 15. When c ≥ 15, stage 1, i.e., the initial increase in h, is often too small in
magnitude such that stage 2 does not sometimes occur. We conclude that the Baldwin effect
occurs for a wide range of c.
4 Discussion
We have shown that reinforcement learning promotes the evolution of mutual cooperation in
a population of players involved in the iterated PD game. Cooperation evolves under some
conditions such as 3P > R+2S, positive but not too large values of ǫ, and tmax that is not too
small. The present study is motivated by previous investigations of the Baldwin effect. Our
results provide an example of the Baldwin effect in the form of a computational model of social
behavior.
To understand the behavior of our model analytically, writing down the Fokker–Planck
equation for the joint density of A1 and h may be useful. Starting from the singular density at
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a small value of A1 and h = 0, we may be able to solve the Fokker–Planck equation numerically
to track the evolution of the joint density to find the Baldwin effect. Alternatively, discretizing
A1 and h and then formulating a Markov chain on the discretized states may also be useful.
Nevertheless, we refrained from such analyses because we consider that they eventually neces-
sitates some numerical simulations and would not sufficiently advance the understanding of our
numerical results.
The concept of the Baldwin effect is diverse (Simpson, 1953; Downes, 2003; Turney et al., 1996).
However, arguably, the most accepted variant of the Baldwin effect is formulated as a two-stage
mechanism (Simpson, 1953; Godfrey-Smith, 2003; Crispo, 2007; Turney et al., 1996). In stage
1, plasticity increases because plastic individuals are better at finding the optimal behavior
than nonplastic individuals. In stage 2, mutation makes the optimal behavior innate and de-
creases the plasticity of individuals. Mutants that play optimally from the outset of their life
without plasticity and resident individuals that acquire the optimal behavior through plastic-
ity are eventually equally efficient. Nevertheless, because of the cost of learning, the mutants
overwhelm the residents via natural selection. Stage 2 is often called genetic assimilation.
Stage 1 in our model corresponds to stage 1 of the standard Baldwin effect outlined above.
In stage 2 in our model, A1 increases such that the optimal behavior (i.e., mutual cooperation
by turning into st3) becomes innate. Nevertheless, after stage 3 in our model in which the
learning rate rapidly decreases, the learning rate starts to perform a random walk because the
learning cost is marginal in our model (Fig. 6(c)). Therefore, the behavior of our model in
stages 2, 3, and onward does not qualify as stage 2 of the standard Baldwin effect in which the
learning rate decreases. With a modified model with an explicit learning cost, we showed that
the learning rate decreases after stage 3 (Fig. 6(d)). In this case, our model naturally fits the
framework of the Baldwin effect.
In a previous computational model of the Baldwin effect, learning rates remain large when
the optimal behavior dynamically changes owing to environmental fluctuations (Ancel, 1999).
In our model without an explicit cost of learning, the learning rate remains large for a different
reason. In our model, the optimal parameter set (i.e., A1 and h) does not fluctuate after
sufficient generations. Instead, approximate optimality is realized for various parameter sets,
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i.e., any P < A1 < R and h ≥ 0. Therefore, the learning rate performs a random walk to
occasionally visit large values (Fig. 6(c)).
Godfrey–Smith points out three alternative reasons why stage 1 cannot be skipped in the
two-stage mechanism of the Baldwin effect (Godfrey-Smith, 2003). First, learning may provide
a breathing space by which a population can survive long enough to transit to stage 2. This
reason is irrelevant to our model because our model is not concerned with the survival of the
population. The population size is fixed in our model such that the population always survives.
Second, the preferred state may be accessible for learners but not for nonlearners. Although
not explicitly stated in Godfrey–Smith (2003), this mechanism seems to be relevant to cases
in which the fitness landscape does not depend on the configuration of the population. In our
case, however, the fitness landscape depends on the fractions of the different types of players
because the payoff to a player is affected by the strategies of the other players. Third, evolution
may change the “social ecology” of the population such that learners are more advantageous
than nonlearners, a phenomenon called niche construction in a broad sense. The social ecology
implies a fitness landscape that depends on the configuration of the population. In our model,
the social ecology evolves via learning of players. This third mechanism seems to be relevant
to our model. Suppose a hypothetical population comprising st1 nonlearners except two st1
learners. For a focal st1 learner, the social ecology is such that there is one st1 learner and
N − 2 st1 nonlearners. If ǫ > 0, the focal st1 learner is likely to gain a payoff that is larger
than an st1 nonlearner because the focal player learns to mutually cooperate with the other
st1 learner, whereas an st1 nonlearner does not. The focal st1 learner would not overwhelm st1
nonlearners if the other st1 learner is absent in the social ecology.
The main purpose of this study is to provide an evolutionary model of concrete social
behavior in which learning plays a constructive role. We are not the first to achieve this end.
Suzuki and Arita observed the Baldwin effect in the iterated PD game using different learning
models (Suzuki & Arita, 2004). In their model, the learning rate is assumed to be binary, and
the player’s strategy is specified by a look-up table that associates the action to take (i.e., C or
D) with the actions of the previous two rounds of the two players. The entries of the look-up
table dynamically change when the plasticity is in operation. They also considered the effects
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of meta–learning in which the player adapts how to update each entry of the look-up table.
The main contribution of the present work relative to theirs is to provide a much simpler model
in terms of the number of plastic parameters. In contrast, the learning rates and the range
of parameters are continuous in our model, whereas they are mostly binary in their model.
Our model may be amenable to real animals and facilitates a mechanistic understanding of
evolutionary dynamics by the numerically calculated adaptive dynamics. Apart from the fixed
parameters common to all the individuals, our players only have two parameters that are
plastic within a generation, pt and At, and two parameters inherited across generations, A1
and h. The results obtained from the adaptive dynamics predict those of direct evolutionary
numerical simulations and provide an intuitive reason why learning promotes the emergence of
mutual cooperation. In particular, we showed the necessity of the evolution of learning ability
for cooperation by explicitly comparing the cases with and without learning. The combination
of adaptive dynamics and evolutionary simulations may also be useful for analyzing the Baldwin
effect in different models.
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Appendix A: Payoff to nonlearning players
Nowak et al. (1995) analyzed iterated matrix games between a pair of players that select an
action (i.e., C or D) in response to the actions of the two players in the previous round. There
are four combinations of the actions of the two players in the previous round, i.e., (C, C), (C,
D), (D, C), and (D, D). Because a player assigns C or D to each of these possible outcomes in
the previous round, there are 16 strategies Si (0 ≤ i ≤ 15). In fact, st1, st2, st3, st4, and st5 in
the present study are equivalent to S12, S8, S9, S1, and S3 in (Nowak et al., 1995), respectively.
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By calculating the steady state of the Markov chain with four states R, T , S, and P , Nowak
et al. (1995) calculated the average payoff to focal player Si playing against the opponent Sj
(0 ≤ i, j ≤ 15) under a small probability of error in action implementation. Their assumption
for the action misimplementation is slightly different from ours. We assumed that ǫ is the
probability that each player independently misimplements the action, whereas only one of the
two players may misimplement the action in a round in their model. Nevertheless, our model
is equivalent to theirs in the limit ǫ → 0 if we set ǫ′ = 2ǫ(1 − ǫ), where ǫ′ is the probability of
action misimplementation in the sense of Nowak et al. (1995). Therefore, our results shown in
Table 1 are a corollary of their results.
Appendix B: Upper bound of h for st2 players to turn
into Pavlov
Given β = ∞, 0 < ǫ ≪ 1, h > 0, and A1 < P , At of the two players, denoted by X and Y,
are sufficiently close to P when one player, which we assume to be Y without loss of generality,
misimplements the action to select C for the first time in round t ∝ 2/ǫ. Without any further
action misimplementation, X keeps D and Y flips to D in round t+1 because A
(Y)
t+1 < P < A
(X)
t+1.
In round t + 2, X flips to C and Y keeps D. Therefore, we obtain A
(X)
t+3 = hS + (1 − h)A
(X)
t+2,
A
(X)
t+2 = hP + (1 − h)A
(X)
t+1, A
(X)
t+1 = hT + (1 − h)A
(X)
t , and A
(X)
t ≈ P . Combining the four
equations, we obtain
A
(X)
t+3 = (T − P )h
3 − 2(T − P )h2 + (T + S − 2P )h+ P. (7)
Using T > P > S and 0 < h ≤ 1, we obtain the condition for X to become Pavlov in round
t+ 3 as A
(X)
t+3 > P , i.e.,
(1− h)2 >
P − S
T − P
. (8)
The condition for Y to become Pavlov in round t + 3 is given by A
(Y)
t+3 > P , i.e.,
(1− h)2 <
T − P
P − S
. (9)
19
Equation (8) implies Eq. (9) because (P − S)/(T − P ) > 0 and h > 0. Therefore, the two
players become Pavlov in round t+ 3 if Eq. (8) holds true.
We assume that Eq. (8) is violated. If Eq. (9) is also violated, we obtain A
(X)
t′ , A
(Y)
t′ ≤
P (t′ ≥ t+ 3) such that the two players mutually defect until the occurrence of another action
misimplementation. If Eq. (9) is satisfied, the two players mutually defect in round t + 3.
Because r
(Y)
t+2 = r
(X)
t = T, r
(Y)
t+3 = r
(X)
t+1 = P , and A
(Y)
t+2 < P , we obtain P < A
(Y)
t+4 < A
(X)
t+2.
Because r
(X)
t+2 = r
(Y)
t = S, r
(X)
t+3 = r
(Y)
t+1 = P , and A
(X)
t+2 > P , we obtain A
(Y)
t+2 < A
(X)
t+4 < P . These
two inequalities indicate that X and Y behave as st3 and st2 in round t + 5, respectively. By
repeating the same procedure with X and Y swapped, we obtain
A
(Y)
t+2 < A
(Y)
t+6 < P < A
(X)
t+6 < A
(X)
t+2. (10)
Therefore, we obtain
A
(Y)
t+2 < A
(Y)
t+2+4i < P < A
(X)
t+2+4i < A
(X)
t+2 (i ≥ 1) (11)
by induction. Equation (11) implies that the two players do not realize mutual cooperation if
Eq. (8) is violated.
Therefore, an upper bound of h for a pair of st2 players to turn into Pavlov is given by
solving Eq. (8) with equality.
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Figure 1: Average payoff to a nonlearning player (row player) playing against an opponent
nonlearning player (column player). We set β = 3, p1 = 0, ǫ = 0.02, h = 0, tmax = 200,
R = 4, T = 5, S = 0, and P = 2.
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Figure 2: Behavior of a pair of learning players. We set β = 3, p1 = 0, and h = 0.1. (a)
Example time courses of the aspiration level for a pair of players when ǫ = 0. The horizontal
lines represent At = P = 2 and At = R = 4. We set A1 for the two players to −1 and −0.5
(thick lines), 2.5 and 3 (dotted lines), and 5.5 and 6 (medium lines). (b) Example time courses
of the aspiration level when ǫ = 0.02. We set A1 as in (a). For each pair, one of the two players
is assumed to misimplement the action to cooperate in round 30 (thick lines), to defect in round
30 (dotted lines), or to cooperate in round 7 (medium lines).
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Figure 3: Discretized adaptive dynamics when ǫ = 0.02. Plotted is π[s′, s] − π[s, s], where
s = (A1, h) and (a) s
′ = (A1 + 0.2, h), (b) s
′ = (A1 − 0.2, h), (c) s
′ = (A1, h + 0.02), and (d)
s′ = (A1, h−0.02). (e) Example time courses of a pair of players having (A1, h) = (1.7, 0.1) and
(A1, h) = (2.2, 0.1) (solid lines), and (A1, h) = (1.7, 0.1) and (A1, h) = (2.2, 0) (dotted lines).
The horizontal line indicates At = P = 2. We set β = 3, p1 = 0, and tmax = 200.
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Figure 4: Discretized adaptive dynamics when ǫ = 0.1. Plotted is π[s′, s] − π[s, s], where
s = (A1, h) and (a) s
′ = (A1 + 0.2, h), (b) s
′ = (A1 − 0.2, h), (c) s
′ = (A1, h + 0.02), and (d)
s′ = (A1, h− 0.02).
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Figure 5: Effects of tmax and ǫ on the adaptive dynamics when A1 ≈ P and h = 0. We
set β = 3 and p1 = 0. (a) π[(2.1, 0), (1.9, 0)] − π[(1.9, 0), (1.9, 0)]. (b) π[(1.9, 0), (2.1, 0)] −
π[(2.1, 0), (2.1, 0)].
29
 0
 0.2
 0.4
 0.6
 0.8
 1
 0  500000  1e+006
generation
(a)
h
Σ|At+1-At|/20
r/R
% mutual C
 0
 0.2
 0.4
 0.6
 0.8
 1
 0  500000  1e+006
generation
(b)
% st1
% st2
% st3
% st4
% st5
 0
 0.05
 0.1
 0.15
 0.2
 0.25
-1  0  1  2  3
h
A1
(c)
1st
3.9x104th 3.5x105th
3.9x105th
106th
Figure 6: Evolutionary dynamics in a population composed of learning players. We set
β = 3, p1 = 0, ǫ = 0.02, tmax = 200, ∆A1 = 0.05, and ∆h = 0.01. (a) Time course of
h,
∑tmax−1
t=1 |At+1 − At|/20, r/R, and the fraction of mutual cooperation. (b) Time course of
the fraction of initially st1, st2, st3, st4, and st5 players in the run shown in (a). (c) Sample
trajectory of the population averages A1 and h in the run shown in (a).
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Figure 7: Sample trajectory of A1 and h when β = 3, p1 = 1, ǫ = 0.02, tmax = 200, ∆A1 = 0.05,
and ∆h = 0.01.
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Figure 8: (a, b) Sample trajectory of A1 and h under a linear cost of learning. We set (a) c = 1
and (b) c = 10. (c) Largest h in each of the five runs of 106 generations for various values of c.
A cross corresponds to a single run. (d) Average of h over the last 104 generations in each run.
(e) Average of A1 over the last 10
4 generations in each run.
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Table 1: Average payoff to a nonlearning player (row player) playing against an opponent
nonlearning player (column player). We set β =∞, 0 < ǫ≪ 1, and tmax =∞.
st1 st2 st3 st4 st5
st1 R+T+S+P
4
R+2S+3P
6
R+T+S+P
4
T+2S+P
4
R+T+S+P
4
st2 R+2T+3P
6
P R+2T+2P
5
T+P
2
T+P
2
st3 R+T+S+P
4
R+2S+2P
5
R R+S+P
3
R+T+S+P
4
st4 2T+S+P
4
S+P
2
R+T+P
3
R+P
2
R+P
2
st5 R+T+S+P
4
S+P
2
R+T+S+P
4
R+P
2
R+T+S+P
4
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